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cogent case for the existence of "negative facts." These two articles cite many of the 
sources, and diverse attempts, that deal with this problem. 
"This is essentially the argument made by Wilfrid Sellars in his "On the Logic of 
Complex Particulars," Mind, n.s., 58(No. 231):306-38. See especially pp. 316-19. 
Though his treatment of "negative facts" is incidental to the development of the nature 
of basic particulars, it is especially interesting in that it denies an Ayer-type incompati- 
bility view, replacing it by an account in terms of "othemess." An examination of this 
view is impossible within the limits of this paper. 
See Sellars, op. cit., p. 318. 
e Ayer, op. cir., p° 802. 
Ibid., p. 803. 
"Ibid., p. 813. 
Ibid., p. 814. 
lo Ibid., p. 815, " . . .  it accounts for the belief that negative statements are somehow 
less directly related to fact than affirmative statements are. They are less directly related 
to fact just in so far as they are less specific." Again, " . . .  we can account for the in- 
clination that many people have towards saying that reality is positive. The explanation 
is that any information which is provided by a less specific statement will always be 
included in the information provided by some more specific statement." 
11 Op. cir., pp. 52-53. 
hOp.  cir., p. 815. "Neither, as has often been remarked, are negative statements, 
when characterized in this way, reducible to affirmatives." The trouble here is, though, 
that the negative, in Ayer's jargon, which cannot be reduced is the less specific undenied 
statement; it is not the denial to which it is equivalent. 
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I n  TaIS essay I shall argue tha t  the  proposi t ions of  analytical ph i losophy 
are a l together  different  f rom and ough t  no t  to  be  confused with  analytical 
proposit ions.  Eschewing  technical  ref inements ,  1 we may  characterize an 
analytical proposi t ion as one  which  is necessarily t rue because its denial  
involves a contradict ion.  T h e  proposi t ions of analytical phi losophy are 
qui te  different,  where  we conceive analytical phi losophy as the  philosophi-  
cal enterprise  which  aims a t  clarifying concepts  by  providing analyses of  
t hem.  2 T o  specify the  difference m o r e  precisely, we  mus t  examine in de- 
tail the  nature  of  analysis. 
AUTHOR'S NOTE. This essay was read at the meeting of the Western Division of the 
American Philosophical Association, at Washington University in St. Louis, in May 
1953. An earlier version was presented to the Philosophical Seminar of the University 
of Chicago, March 6, 1952. 
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Some insight into the process of analysis can be gained from a considera- 
tion of its products. The end results of philosophical analysis appear to be 
definitions of various sorts. These range from Berkeley's dictum that a 
physical object "is nothing but a congeries of sensible impressions ''8 
through Russell's paradigmatic contextual definition of "the so-and-so ''4 
to Quine's pronouncement that "to be is to be a value of a variable. ''5 We 
have been informed by Broad s and Ramsey ~ as well as Ayer s that the proper 
task of philosophy is to provide definitions, and have been assured that the 
work of Plato was "predominantly analytic, ''9 presumably because of the 
central position occupied by definitions in his dialogues. 
But there are different kinds of definitions, and not all of them are 
relevant to the topic of philosophical analysis. A very useful and familiar 
type of definition is that found in dictionaries. These lexical definitions, 
which are empirical reports of actual word usage, serve the purpose of in- 
structing people in the use of words with well-established meanings or 
usages. They are of no greater interest to the philosopher than they are to 
anyone else. A different type of definition is that which is given a word or 
symbol when it is first introduced. This may be either upon its invention, 
as when Gilbreth made up the word "therblig" for use in time and motion 
study, or upon its use in a new and special context, as when mathemati- 
cians gave a new sense to the old word "derivative" in the new context 
of the differential calculus. The philosopher is not interested in these 
merely stipnlative definitions either. The aim of the analytical philosopher 
is to arrive at definitions of words with well-established usages, but not 
definitions which merely report what those usages "are. 
We can best explain the nature of the definitions sought by analytical 
philosophers by first discussing a certain type of definition which is im- 
portant in science. An example is the chemist's definition of an acid as a 
substance which contains hydrogen as a positive radical. 1° This definition 
is not a lexical one, for the ordinary nontechnical use of the word "acid" 
by housewives and mechanics has nothing to do with ionization theory. 
Nor is it a stipulative definition, for the term "acid" had a well-established 
usage before the ionization theory was promulgated, and everything which 
is correctly called an acid in ordinary usage is denoted by the term "acid" 
as defined by the chemist. The chemist's purpose in giving his definition 
of the term "acid" is to formulate a theoretically adequate characterization 
of the obiects to which the term is customarily applied. The chemist's 
definition is intended to attach to the word, as meaning or connotation, 
that property which in the framework of his theory is most useful for 
understanding and predicting the behavior of those substances which the 
word denotes. To propose or accept a definition of this type is tantamount 
to proposing or accepting the theory which underlies it. Because of their 
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close connection with and dependence on theories, it will be convenient 
to refer to definitions of this type as "theoretical definitions. T M  To give a 
theoretical definition amounts to affirming the correctness of the theory in 
whose terminology the definition is formulated. 
It is in connection with theoretical definitions that most disputing over 
definitions occurs. For a period in the history of physics there were two 
rival definitions of heat. One of them defined it to be a subtle imponder- 
able fluid (caloric), the other defined it to be the average kinetic energy 
of molecules in random motion. When  the researches of Rumford, Davy, 
and Joule established the (more probable) correctness of the kinetic theory, 
the definition of heat as caloric was abandoned and the theoretical defini- 
tion of heat in terms of kinetic energy was accepted. When  the kinetic 
theory was established as an adequate theory of heat phenomena, then the 
kinetic definition of heat was regarded as effecting a clarification of the 
concept of heat. 
On the basis of his ionization hypothesis, the chemist has analyzed the 
concept of acid; and on the basis of his molecular theory, the physicist 
has analyzed the concept of heat. The results of their analyses have been 
formulated in theoretical definitions. The philosopher has only a methodo- 
logical interest in such concepts and their analyses, since they belong to 
the various special sciences. But the philosopher has a profound and lively 
interest in the more general concepts of truth, of existence, of cause, of 
physical object, of property and relation, and the like. The aim of analyti- 
cal philosophy is to analyze these concepts and to define them. 
When  a philosopher gives a definition of such a fundamental category- 
term as cause or physical object, his definition is neither lexical nor stipu- 
lative. He is proposing a theoretical definition, although the theory which 
underlies his definition is neither chemical nor physical, but philosophical. 
As in the sciences, so also in philosophy: to give a theoretical definition 
amounts to affirming the correctness of the theory in whose terminology 
the definition is formulated. The analytical philosopher affirms the truth 
of the propositions which embody the results of his analyses, but he need 
not, and generally does not, assert them to be analytical propositions. 
It should be clear that most analytical philosophers do not believe their 
definitions to be analytical propositions. In the first place, many analyses 
are defended by elaborate arguments which appeal to empirical evidence 
of one sort or another (consider, for example, the arguments from rela- 
tivity and the thermal paradox in Berkeley)12 And in the second place, 
the method of proving a proposition to be analytical by deducing a con- 
tradiction from its denial is not at all the usual technique by which ana- 
lytical philosophers attempt to show the correctness of their analyses. 
There is, nevertheless, a tendency in some quarters to think either that 
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the definitions which embody analyses are analytical propositions, or that 
analytical propositions follow directly from them as necessary conditions. 
One or another of these erroneous views can be attributed to C. E. Moore. 
In the much-discussed Section 6 of Principia Ethica he asserts that good 
is unanalyzable and therefore cannot be defined, and asserts further that 
this amounts to saying that propositions about the good are all of them 
synthetic and never analytic, la Moore appears to believe that if there were 
a correct analysis then that analysis would either be or would entail an 
analytical proposition. (Actually he seems to believe that only an analysis 
or the result of an analysis can be an analytical proposition, but  we need 
not go into that further error.) However interesting in its own right may 
be the question of how an analytical proposition can be informative, it 
is the sheerest mistake to suppose that question to have any bearing on 
the method of analysis or the value of analytical philosophy. Yet in raising 
and pursuing that question under the rubric of the "paradox of analysis," a 
number of other philosophers seem to have followed Moore in his mistake. 
T h e  process of analysis is one of changing meanings to the end of em- 
bodying greater theoretical insight into the facts to which our language 
refers. As Broad has said: "What  we believe at the end of the process and 
what we believed at the beginning are by no means the same, although 
we express the two beliefs by the same form of words. ''14 Since philosophi- 
cal analysis does result in theoretical definitions of philosophical concepts 
rather than in analytical propositions, to appraise the correctness or ade- 
quacy of an analysis requires that we appraise the correctness or adequacy 
of the philosophical theory involved in that analysis. The  latter is a very 
difficult task indeed, as all serious students of philosophy realize. 
Because of the difficulty of the fundamental task, certain short-cut alter- 
native methods of evaluating analyses are sometimes proposed. Perhaps the 
most popular of the current nostrums is the touchstone of clarity. One 
writer has recently given his opinion that "the fundamental requirement 
for correct analysis is that ideas in the analysans be clearer than those 
under analysis. 'n5 However attractive this proposal may seem at first sight, 
it cannot be accepted. 
Of the many shibboleths of the analytic school perhaps "clarity" itself 
is the least clear. T he  clarity of a concept to a philosopher is strictly rela- 
tive to the general philosophical position or theory of that philosopher. 
Thus to a phenomenalist or quasi-phenomenalist like C. E. Moore, the 
term "sense-data" is presumably the last word in clarity. And so it seemed 
"quite certain" to him in his "Defense of Common Sense" that the analy- 
sis of propositions expressing perceptual judgments must be in terms of 
sense-data? 6 But how clear is the notion of a sense-datum to a non-phe- 
nominalist? No one who read Professor Bouwsma's essay in the Moore 
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volume could help but  be amused at the good-natured bewilderment suf- 
fered by Bouwsma in his prolonged but  unsuccessful at tempt to follow 
out Moore's directions for finding the elusive sense-datum. 17 And some 
of us remember the tremendous difficulty Moore and others have had in 
trying to understand the notion of usefulness as used by William James 
and other pragmatists, to whom that concept was the quintessence of 
clarity. TM No, clarity cannot be adopted as the criterion for appraising philo- 
sophical analyses, for the concept of clarity is too personal and subjective. 
It is incorrigibly relative; one man's light is another man's darkness. 
Another criterion which is sometimes suggested for use here, at least by 
implication, is epistemotogical priority. 19 But a moment's reflection will 
show that it too is unacceptable. There is too much disagreement in the 
field of epistemology. Hume said that he perceived only impressions. But 
the late Professor Reichenbach's experience was quite different: he saw 
tables and houses and many other things, but never saw his impressions. 
He did not deny that he had impressions, but they were not sensed, they 
were rather inferred by him. ~° Bertrand Russell held sense-data to have the 
highest degree of epistemological priority; 21 John Dewey insisted that they 
were rather the conclusions of psychological theory. ~z 
One other criterion is often used but never explicitly formulated. That 
is "'ordinary language" as the ultimate test for the correctness of philosophi- 
cal analysis. But this mistakes the purpose of the entire enterprise. We  
have ordinary language, and what we lack will be graciously supplied to us 
by our colleagues the lexicographers. Were we satisfied with it we should 
attempt no analyses, but  rest content with what we have. We can per- 
fectly well understand a person's preferring "plain English" to the more 
technical discourse of the philosopher. But such a person should have the 
sense to restrict his conversation to plain Engtishmen, rather than to con- 
demn the philosopher for failure to achieve what never was his goal. 
The adequacy of a proposed analysis cannot be evaluated on ground of 
clarity, epistemological priority, or consonance with ordinary language. An 
analysis presupposes and reflects a theory, and must be appraised together 
with the theory upon which it is based. Theories are intended to explain 
or to account for facts, and so a theory has merit to the extent to which it 
squares with and accounts for the facts. Broad has put the matter very 
well, writing: 
When  we say that Philosophy tries to clear up the meaning of concepts 
we do not mean that it is simply concerned to substitute some long phrase 
for some familiar word. Any analysis, when once it has been made, is 
naturally expressed in words; but so too is any other discovery. When  
Cantor gave his definition of Continuity, the final result of his work was 
expressed by saying that you can substitute for the word "continuous" such 
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and such a verbal phrase. But the essential part of the work was to find 
out exactly what properties are present in objects when we predicate con- 
tinuity of them, and what properties are absent when we refuse to predicate 
continuity. This was evidently not a question of words but of things and 
their properties. 23 
Philosophers are of course interested in analyzing many concepts. There 
is a certain obvious danger here which it is well to remark. When  two 
different concepts are analyzed, and two different theoretical definitions 
are proposed for them, we must be on guard that the theories involved are 
not inconsistent with each other. As more and more concepts are analyzed 
the underlying theories will become more and more numerous or extensive. 
The ultimate goal is to achieve analyses of all philosophical concepts; and 
of course it is desirable that the theories which underlie their definitions 
should be not just mutually consistent, but actually integrated into a single 
unified theory. So the goal of analytical philosophy is the achievement of 
a philosophical theory which shall be adequate to answer all philosophical 
questions by providing analyses of the philosophical concepts involved. 
That, however, is the traditional goal of speculative, systematic, synoptic 
philosophy. It would be invidious to say that either one is "really" the 
other. But it is heartening to remark that the perennial goals of philosophy 
are, if not nearer, at least unchanged. 
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NOTES 
1 Such as the view that analytieity is always relative to a language, which is ably de- 
fended by Professor R. M. Martin in his article "On 'Analytie'," Philosophical Studies, 
3:42-47 (April 1952). If Professor Martin's view is correetmas I believe it to be--then 
afortion the conclusions of the present article are correct also. 
In this essay I shall be concerned only with such analytical philosophers as Russell, 
Moore, and Broad. My remarks are not directed toward the Oxford-centered writers of 
the ordinary language cult, for whom the term 'analytical philosophers' does not seem 
altogether appropriate. 
8 Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, Third Dialogue. Berkeley's view 
has been reformulated by latter-day phenomenalists as a (contextual) definition of the 
term 'material thing' or 'physical object.' Cf. A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 
pp. 54ff; "Phenomenalism," ,~ristotelian Society Proceedings, 47:169 (1946-47); and 
Paul Marhenke, "Phenomenalism," Philosophlcal Analysis (edited by Max Black), pp. 
299ff. 
""On Denoting," Mind, n.s. 14:479-93 (1905). Reprinted in Readings in Philo- 
sophical Analysis, edited by H. Feigl and SV. S, el h,,rs, pp. 103-15. 
Methods of Logic, p. 224. Cf. also Quine s On What There Is," Review of Meta- 
physics, 2:21-38 (1948). 
Scientific Thought, p. 18. 
The Foundations ol Mathematics, pp. 263-69. 
* Language, Truth and Logic, p. 68. 
Ibid., p. 59. 
10 Smith's College Chemistry, by James Kendall, p. 268. 
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A more detailed discussion of this type of definition is presented in Chapter 4 of 
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fourth annual essay competition sponsored by this journal. Prizes will be 
given for the best brief essays (not to exceed 2500 words) of an analytical 
character on a philosophical topic postmarked on or before June 15, 1954, 
by a graduate student in this country or abroad who does not, at the time 
he submits his essay, have the Ph.D. degree or its equivalent. 
FIRST PRIZE: Publication in Philosophical Studies, a $50 United States 
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